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•ts, Measures of currency reform will be facilitatedif the practice of
continuous cooperation among central banks of issue, or banks regulating
credit policy in the several countries can be developed. Such cooperation
of central banks, not necessarily confined to Europe, would provide
• opportunities of coordinating their policy, without hampering the freedom
of the several banks.'
(From Resolution 3 of the Report of the
FinancialCommission of the Genoa
Conference, 1922.)
•ial
ith In the days of the gold standard, it is sometimes said, international policy
coordination was a moot point.' Popular accounts based more on
fly caricature than on careful historical analysis portray the gold standard as
a remarkably eflicient mechanism for coordinating the actions of national
we authorities. Policies were so easily reconciled, it is argued, because those
g
responsible for their formulation, regardless of nationality, shared a belief
in balanced budgets and a common overriding objective: pegging the
ng domestic currency price of gold. When central banks intervened in
financial markets, it is suggested, they did so mechanically, obeying 'rules
of the game' which dictated that they only reinforce the impact on
domestic money and credit markets of balance of payments conditions.
For example, a central bank losing reserves would raise its discount rate
while the central bank gaining reserves would lower its discount rate,
thereby reinforcing one another's efforts to restore external balance. Hence
monetary policy under the gold standard is a favorite example of those
who argue that international policy coordination is most readily achieved
under a rules-based regime rather than one that depends on discretion.
This naive vision of the days of the gold standard as a simpler, more
harmonious era is at best partial and at worst misleading. The very actions
of central banks suggest that their objectives were not in fact so easily
reconciled by the operation of gold standard constraints. Discount rates
139
— a • - .140 BarryEichengreen
tended to move together, not inversely as the 'rules of the game' would
suggest.2 Central banks sterilized international gold flows more often than the
they intervened to reinforce their impact on domestic markets.3 These and
other actions resemble the outcome of a noncooperative game, in which as ti
the participants act to neutralize rather than accommodate the efforts of wee
their counterparts. Yet onoccasion central banks and governments
managed to achieve cooperative solutions to their problems, such as when of
theynegotiated swap arrangements, earmarked gold,or extended this
international loans.4 Both central banks and governments clearly recognized the
their interdependence, if they did not always succeed in coordinating their inte
actions.
Still, it is fair to say that the interwar period opened the modern era of -it
interdependence.In the 1920s questions of policy coordination and central tos4
bank cooperation acquired a new tone of urgency. In part this reflected por
greater opportunities for coordinating policies in a world with a Bank for pre
International Settlements, an international telegraph, and a trans-Atlantic for
telephone.5 In part it reflected the higher costs of ignoring interdependence pef ¶
in a world of rapid communication, integrated markets and volatile capAtal Co
flows. Above all it reflected the widening scope for conflict as governments natO
attached growing importance to domestic economic objectives and put less dis
weight on balance of payments targets. acti
The interwar period provides examples of various forms of successful wit
collaboration. The League of Nations provided stabilization loans to
countries experiencing hyperinflation in return for their accession to the
protocols which precluded their central banks from monetizing budget an
deficits and committed them to return to gold. International conferences is
held at Brussels in 1920 and Genoa in 1922 laid the basis for reconstructing ope
the international monetary system. The United States saw Britain's return mo
to gold as the linchpin upon which the gold standard's resurrection beak
depended, and it provided credits of $300 million to facilitate Britain's stars
restoration of the prewar sterling parity.8 These efforts were fully successful coot
in reconstructing the international system: once its renewal had been
signaled by Britain's return to gold, some fifty nations joined the US and ii
the UK as participants in the interwar gold standard.
Yet the interwar period provides equally dramatic illustrations of
failures of cooperation and their costs. The brief duration and early demise reM.
of the interwar gold standard is taken to indicate the inability of major
participants to effectively coordinate their actions. A prime example is the
failure of the countries at the center to harmonize their choice of parities. Agr
The important cases are Great Britain, where overvaluation of sterling was Wh
associated with unprecedented levels of unemployment and depression in pan
the export trades; and France, where undervaluation of the franc was tighInternational coordination in historical perspective 141
ild associated with sustained economic growth and until 1931 insulation from
an the worst effects of the Great Depression. One corollary of this competitive
nd imbalance was an uneven international distribution of gold. Nations such
ch as the United States and France whose international competitive positions
of were relatively strong acquired and retained a large portion of the world's
•ts monetary gold, leaving others such as Britain to defend the convertibility
en of their currencies on the basis of slender reserves. Another indication of
ed this inability to coordinate policies was the widespread failure to play by
:ed the rules of the gold standard game; instead central banks sterilized
eir international reserve flows and hesitated to adjust their discount rates in
response to external pressures.
—of This paper takes a new look at the financial history of the interwar period
-ral to see what light this experience sheds on current concerns over international
ted policy coordination. After a review of the literature and the historical
ror preconditions, it tells a story in three parts. The first part examines the role
ttic for policy coordination as envisaged by contemporaries at the start of the
rice period. It takes as a case study the Genoa Economic and Financial
ital Conference of 1922. We will argue that the advantages of policy coordi-
nts nation were in fact well understood in the twenties but that political
ess disagreements impeded efforts to establish a mechanism for cooperative
action. Instead, policymakers ultimately pursued noncooperative strategies
;ful within the framework of the international gold standard.
to The second part considers the effects of noncooperative behavior once
to the gold standard was again in operation. Identifying these effects requires
get an explicit model. Yet the idea of strategic behavior by national authorities
ces is wholly incompatible with standard models of the gold standard's
ing operation. The analysis therefore requires the development of an alternative
irn model of the interwar gold standard. While the model developed below
ion bears little resemblance to previous frameworks used to analyze gold
n's standard adjustment, it indicates clearly not only the advantages of
•ful coordinated action but suggests why cooperative solutions proved so
difficult to achieve.
nd The final part concerns the question of what the principal participants
learned from their pursuit of noncooperative strategies. The lessons of the
of interwar gold standard as they were understood by contemporaries found
use reflection in the next attempt to reconstruct the international monetary
jor order: the Tripartite Monetary Agreement concluded by Britain, France
the and the United States in the autumn of The terms of the Tripartite
ies. Agreement were remarkably similar to the Genoa Resolutions of 1922.
vas • Wherethey differed was in the absence of favorable references to fixed
iin parities and to the gold-exchange standard. They differed as well by more
vas tightly circumscribing the range of issues subject to collaboration. This142 BarryEichengreen
along with the decline of political obstacles to cooperation permitted the a
noble sentiments of the Tripartite Agreement to be implemented. Thus, in
the history of international financial collaboration in the interwar period
sheds light not only on the rationale for policy coordination but also on c
the circumstances conducive to its practice.
0
1.Leadership and cooperation under a gold standard regime
tic
Intheoretical treatments of the gold standard's operation, there is no scope t
forpolicy coordination. The adjustment process works automatically,
affecting surplus and deficit countries alike. The price-specie-flow variant
of the adjustment mechanism emphasizes the role of relative prices in ov
restoring external balance. A gold outflow leads to monetary deflation and ov
falling prices until the international competitiveness of the goods produced ao
by the deficit country is enhanced sufficiently to restore equilibrium to the
external accounts. The monetary variant of the adjustment mechanism mi
stresses the role of wealth and real balance effects. A gold outflow reduces
absorption through the real balance effect on consumption until the po
equality of income and expenditure is restored. In each case, the surplus
country is affected symmetrically. Beyond standing ready to buy and sell by
gold at the official price, the only role for central banks is to mechanically chi
reinforce the impact on domestic money and credit markets of incipient dei
gold flows. by
Strikingly, these theoretical treatments bear little resemblance to histori- no
cal analyses of the gold standard's operation either at the end of the 19th to
century or between the wars. Where theoretical models describe central J bil
banks as mechanically reinforcing one another's actions, historical accounts co
emphasize instead the potential for conflict between national authorities Gi
and their strategic interaction. Yet in none of these accounts is the scope fo
for conflict adequately defined, leaving unclear the advantages of leadership as
and cooperation. beq
Historical descriptions of the classical gold standard place great weight
on asymmetries in the system's operation. Great Britain in particular is
seen as possessing unrivaled abilities to manipulate the process of adjust-
ment. Britain's market power is attributed to her position as the world's
foremost trading and lending nation. British exports, which had already to 1.
quadrupled between 1800 and 1850, increased eightfold between 1850 and
19 13, and on the eve of the first World War Britain accounted for 14 per p0'
cent of world exports, a figure far exceeding her share of world production fin
or income. The world's principal organized commodity markets all were the'
centered in England. Not the least of these was the London gold market, of
which regularly received the bulk of South Africa's gold production. In p01International coordination in historical perspective 143
he addition, Britain had no close competitor as the world's preeminent
international lender. By 1913, British overseas investments amounted to
nearly 45 per cent of the external investments of the major creditor
countries of the West. Britain's annual capital export was nearly five times
that of France, her nearest rival. Never before or since have a nation's
overseas investments been such a large share of national income.8
Britain's commercial and financial preeminence had profound implica-
tions for the international role of sterling, which had implications in turn
for the operation of the adjustment mechanism. Sterling was the world's
leading vehicle currency in international transactions. Trade that neither
snt touched British shores nor passed through the hands of British merchants
in overseas might nonetheless be invoiced in sterling. Transactions the world
md over were settled with the transfer of sterling balances between foreign
accounts maintained in London. Securities denominated in sterling were
the the most popular form of international reserves with which central banks
sm might supplement their stocks of gold.9
ices Under these circumstances, it is argued, the Bank of England exercised
the powerful leverage over international flows of commodities, capital and
gold —leverageit could employ to manipulate the process of adjustment
sell by which external balance was restored. Changes in Bank Rate (the rate
ally charged by the Bank of England for loans to discount houses and other
ent dealers in Treasury and commercial bills) exerted an influence not shared
by foreign discount rates and to a large extent determined credit conditions
not merely at home but abroad.'° A rise in Bank Rate is typically thought
9th to have forced up the required rate of return on Treasury and commercial
tral bills, and by rendering these assets more attractive increased the opportunity
nts cost to the banking sector of extending loans and overdrafts to borrowers.
ties Given the share of sterling loans and advances in international markets
for short-term capital, rates of return on foreign-currency-denominated
hip assets that were substitutes for sterling were forced up as well. Moreover,
because the world's most important gold market also was located in
ght London, the Bank of England by altering the cost and availability of
r is short-term credit directly influenced the tendency of non-residents to
ist- purchase and ship abroad gold newly delivered to market.
id's To paraphrase Walter Bagehot's famous aphorism, raising Bank Rate
to a sufficiently high level would succeed in drawing gold from the moon.
md This leverage over capital flows followed from the fact that no foreign
per power could match the Bank of England's influence in international
ion financial markets. The United States, without even a central bank, lacked
,ere the resources and the expertise to rival Britain in the market. The Bank
ket, of France's sphere of influence was limited to Russia and France's colonial
•In possessions. Foreign authorities possessed no feasible alternative but to144 BarryEichengreen
respond to Bank of England initiatives, as the British understood. Hence, fo
the Bank of England could anticipate with considerable accuracy the tici
response of foreign authorities to a change in Bank Rate in London, and im
it could frame its policy accordingly. To the Deputy Governor of the Bank
of England Keynes described the reaction of foreign governments in the be
following way: 'In prewar days it used to be maintained —Ithink th
truly —thatto a large extent we led the world; that is to say, if we reduced su
Bank rate it probably brought about a corresponding reduction in the rates na
in other countries.'1' As he framed the argument when helping to draft the its
report of the Macmillan Committee, Britain could 'by the operation of ha
her Bank Rate almost immediately adjust her reserve position. Other
countries had, therefore, in the main, to adjust their conditions to hers."
There is little agreement on the costs and benefits of the Bank of
England's exercise of leadership. The benign view of the prewar arrangement retil
is that it operated to the benefit of both the leader and her followers by of
permitting the participants in the gold standard system to economize in in 4
theiruse of gold. The Bank of England could maintain a slender gold
reserve because she had the power to reverse a gold outflow through Wal
unilateralinitiative. Other central banks, such as those of France, Ne
Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia, has less leverage over financial ma
flows and were therefore forced to hold larger reserves in order to
accommodate wider swings in their reserve positions. But due to the Bank a
of England's capacity to operate with relatively slender reserves, the gold ded
backing of the world's monetary base could be efficiently reduced. Since
the Bank of England's leverage over international capital flows erased any
lingering doubts about the convertibility of sterling, other countries were bud,
encouraged to supplement their holdings of gold with this key currency, th&
further augmenting international reserves to the benefit of all concerned. acel
A less sanguine view is that through her exercise of market power Britain
was capable of shifting the burden of adjustment abroad. Triffin has argued
that, due to London's singular importance as a source of credit for the!
financing international transactions in foodstuffs and raw materials,
Britain was through the impact of Bank Rate overseas more than Fra
compensated for the economic costs of stringent credit conditions.'3 The Fo11
argument is that a temporary credit stringency swung the terms of trade fraif
in Britain's favor by increasing the cost to foreign producers of carrying in I'
stocksof primary products. Given the higher cost of holding inventories,
stocks of foodstuffs and raw materials were dumped onto world markets,
reducing the cost of British imports. Obviously, carrying costs were the
important as well to British producers of manufactured exports, who had
the same incentive as producers of primary commodities to liquidate stocks a flil
in the face of tighter credit conditions. Assuming however that the market 11
•- _.__________l_—International coordination in historical perspective 145
for primary products was characterized by exceptionally low price elas-
the ticities of demand, Britain's international terms of trade would still have
and improved on balance.'4
ank By the interwar period, it is frequently suggested, circumstances had
the been transformed. Britain no longer possessed unparalleled influence over
•tink the international adjustment mechanism. Other nations had acquired
iced sufficient leverage to formulate if not independent then at least distinctive
ates national policies, leaving the Bank of England in no better position than
the its rivals to ignore developments abroad. In particular, the interwar period
n of has been characterized as the era when London declined to the benefit of
•ther New York.'5 The war and its aftermath had transformed the United States
from a net debtor to a net creditor, and she suddenly found herself in
c of possession of a large share of the world's monetary gold. When Britain
•cient returned to gold in 1925, US gold reserves were roughly six times those
s by of the Bank of England. The British government owed the US $4.7 billion
:e in in war debts, although their ultimate magnitude and the schedule by to
•gold which they might be repaid remained very much in doubt. Moreover,
ugh Washington was newly equipped with a Federal Reserve Board and
nce, New York with a Federal Reserve Bank to direct and carry out financial
icial market intervention.
r to Through the first part of the twenties New York surpassed London as
ank a source of funds invested abroad. The UK's share of world export value
sold declined from 14 per cent in 1913 to barely 12 per cent in 1925 and little
ince more than 11 per cent in 1928. Before the war, Britain had consistently
any run current account surpluses; in the century ending in 1913 there had been
vere but two years of deficit. The situation was different between the wars; in
ncy, the short span from 1925 to 1931 there were already two years of current
ned. account deficit.'6 Bankers and merchants, finding themselves to be dealing
tam with both financial centers and running down the balances on sterling
accounts maintained in London, increasingly held diversified portfolios of
for the two key currencies.
ials, The British position was not eased by concurrent developments in
han France. Unlike Britain, France's share of world trade was stable after 1913.
The Following de facto stabilization in 1926 at a rate which undervalued the
rnade franc, France's external position remained strong until Britain's devaluation
•ying in 1931. In 1928, when dejure convertibility of the franc was restored, the
ries, Bank of France's holdings of liquid sterling assets roughly matched in
value the Bank of England's entire gold reserve. Over the next four years,
vere the Bank of France engaged in a persistent effort to convert these balances
had into gold as part of a conscious policy of elevating Paris to the stature of
)cks a first-rank financial center.'7
.rket The British authorities recognized their heightened interdependence
a146 Barry Eichengreen
with foreign nations. In particular, the Bank of England found it impossible
to neglect the reaction of foreign central banks to a prospective change 11.
in Bank Rate. Were the Bank of England to disregard foreign reactions w
whensetting its discount rate, it would 'render itself liable to be flooded 19
with, or depleted of, gold, as the case may be.' As high an official as the de
Deputy Governor of the Bank of England admitted that 'such leadership de
as we possessed has certainly been affected by the position which America
has gained."8 eq
While policymakers clearly recognized their heightened interdependence, c
theimplications of this recognition remain somewhat unclear. One th
literature attempts to document the stimulus this recognition of inter- be
dependence provided for cooperative action. For example, Clarke (1967)
describes instances where central banks extended to one another routine
clearing services, shared privileged information, and arranged inter-
national stabilization loans. Another literature emphasizes the inability of
policy-makers to coordinate their actions despite this recognition of th4
interdependence. Thus, Viner (1932, p. 28) and Gayer (1937, p. 29) describe de ¶
London, Paris and New York as having worked at 'cross-purposes.' Yet Ot
it is not easy to extract from their analyses a sense of how working at im
cross-purposes affected the operation of the monetary system. In part this ha
is due to the tendency of these authors to argue by analogy rather than in
specifying the economic model they have in mind. Nevin (1955, p. 12) is
typical of this mode when, likening the monetary system to fo
an automobile, he characterizes Britain and the United States as 'two quite pe
excellent drivers...perpetuallyfighting to gain control of the vehicle.' A
system influenced by the actions of two financial centers, like a car with prj.
two drivers, will function only if those centers are capable of cooperating pe4'
and acting consistently. But, he goes on, 'in the real world, this seldom
happens, and the existence of more than one centre with powers of control
leads to the existence of more than one policy.' What we would like to know
is whether the presence of two chauffeurs causes the car to be driven too
fast, too slowly, or too erratically, and what the implications of the
chauffeurs' behavior are for the welfare of the passengers. bei
Arguments by analogy, however appealing, provide no answer to these by
questions. The historian's instinct is to turn to the documents for guidance. by'
The economist's is to construct a model. We consider these approaches in
in turn.International coordination in historical perspective 147
le II. The Genoaconference of 1922and the role for cooperation
When the Genoa Economic and Financial Conference convened in Apnl
1922, European exchange and trade relations were in disarray. Physical
he devastation in the main theaters of the war created persistent excess
demands for foodstuffs and raw materials, particularly in Central and
ca Eastern Europe. Capital goods imports were needed to replace plant and
equipment destroyed in the course of the war. Yet the nations of
Continental Europe possessed limited resources out of which to finance
ne the required imports. Industrial and agricultural production remained well
below 1913 levels.'9 The United States curtailed and quickly eliminated
i7) official lending to its European allies, insisted on prompt repayment of its
-ne war loans, and constrained Europe's capacity to earn foreign exchange by
sharply raising tariff rates. Europe therefore turned to deficit spending to
of finance economic reconstruction2° Some such as the French proceeded on
of the premise that Reparations payments would eventually permit any new
•be debt to be retired and prewar monetary arrangements to be restored.
'et Others such as the Germans were preoccupied almost entirely by the
at immediate problem of reconstruction. By the summer of 1920 the mark
his had already begun its descent; the franc, in contrast, fluctuated uneasily
an in response to new information about prospects for Reparations.
'is In Western Europe and the United States, the Armistice had been
to followed by a sudden and dramatic boom. Consumers finally were
ite permitted to vent demands that had been pent up during the war, and
A producers took the opportunity to replenish their stocks. In Britain the
ith pressure of demand led to an inflation of prices unprecedented in
ng peacetime. Employment expanded rapidly, and wages rose in response. In
light of these inflationary pressures, the Bank of England raised its
discount rate in November 1919 and April 1920. Almost simultaneously,
industrial production turned down, and unemployment among trade
union members rose from 1.4 to 16.7 per cent within a year. Wholesale
he prices fell by nearly 50 per cent between the spring of 1920 and the
beginning of 1922. In France wholesale prices turned down in May, falling
se by 41 per cent within a year, while the index of industrial production fell
by eight per cent between 1920 and 1921. In the United States fluctuations
in industrial production, while not as pronounced as in Britain, followed
basically the same pattern, while wholesale prices fell by 46 per cent in the
10 months following their May 1920 peak.21
As in the 1970s, financial instability impeded efforts to liberalize
international trade. Since the major belligerents had all imposed trade
controls in the course of the war, they had in place the administrative
machinery needed to administer import licensing and quota schemes.148 Barry Eichengreen
While some such as Britain rapidly moved to dismantle wartime controls,
others such as France, which initially emulated the British example, turned
back to tariff protection once their currencies began to depreciate. Trade
with central Europe was further depressed by the slow recovery of these
economies. Together with the embargo on Russian trade, the prospects for
an export-led recovery appeared dim.
The Reparations question cast a shadow over attempts at monetary
reconstruction and impeded efforts to arrange cooperative solutions to
Europe's financial problems. The provisions of the Treaty of Versailles
designed to provide a mechanism by which realistic Reparations claims
might be negotiated were disabled by the refusal of the US Congress to
ratify the Treaty. The Treaty itself deferred final determination of the
amount of Reparations but required an initial payment of 200,000 million
gold marks, the first installment falling due in May 1921.22 When the
Reparations Commission, staffed not by financial experts but by politicians wo
taking instructions from their governments, finally determined the value ecq
of Reparations in April 1921, the amount was fixed at $32 billion, three
times the sum recommended by the economic experts at Versailles and a of
much larger amount than the Germans anticipated. In principle, the
transfer might be made by payment in gold, payment in services, or pe
payment in commodities. Yet the Reichsbank's gold reserve barely at
amounted to one semi-annual Reparations payment. German guest ph
workers would scarcely be welcomed in neighboring countries already fro
experiencing high unemployment. Thus, Germany had no alternative but in
to attempt to finance its transfer through an export surplus. The value of
the transfer Germany might have accomplished given the impact of the lik
surplus on her terms of trade has been debated ever since.23 The only En
certainty from the point of view of financial market participants was that to
the magnitude and timing of Reparations payments would remain
uncertain, with unknown implications for the public finances of the major be
creditor countries.
This was the background against which the Genoa Conference of 1922
was convened. Genoa was only one in a series of international monetary pre
and financial conferences held in the 1920s, and negotiations there were ec
not unrelated to previous meetings at Brussels in 1920 and at Cannes in H
January 1922. For example, the participants in the Brussels Conference mt •
hasissued declarations which resembled in general terms the resolutions
subsequently adopted at Genoa. However, only at Genoa were the mt
particulars of these proposals specified and methods for implementing
them through the international coordination of policies given explicit Ge
consideration. adInternational coordination in historical perspective 149
Thecountries with greatest influence over the proceedings at Genoa
werethe United States, France and Britain. The three nations approached
the Conference with very different objectives. Despite other differences the
se Americans and the British shared a common interest in rebuilding the
or international economy. The leaders of both nations agreed that recovery
required the revitalization of foreign trade, for which reconstruction of the
gold standard was a necessary prerequisite. Beyond these general goals,
•to however, the two sets of policymakers had little in common. The British
es were willing to go considerably further than the Americans to promote the
expansion of trade. They hoped that diplomatic and commercial relations
to with the Soviet government could be established and that Reparations
—he could be reduced. To facilitate the renegotiation of Reparations, they
suggested that the United States forgive at least a portion of its war debt
he claims. With this groundwork laid, they hoped that the creditor countries
would be encouraged to extend loans to the European debtors, promoting
ue economic recovery on the Continent and stimulating international trade.
ee While restoring sterling's prewar parity was seen as an essential element
I a of monetary reconstruction, the British were wary of the economic costs
he that the deflation associated with restoration might entail. From their
or perspective the preferred solution was inflation abroad rather than deflation
• at home —inparticular, inflation in the United States. The British contem-
plated various schemes to encourage the Americans to inflate, ranging
•dy from subtle diplomatic pressure to a far-fetched plan to immediately pay
)ut in gold a large share of Britain's war debt in order to drastically expand
of the American monetary base.24 This last scheme was dismissed due to the
he likelihood of American sterilization and its impact on the Bank of
ily England's reserve position. It would be preferable for monetary expansion
tat to be initiated abroad and backed as necessary by reserves of foreign
Un exchange. That a significant portion of foreign exchange reserves would
or be held in the form of sterling undoubtedly figured in British calculations.25
Although the Americans shared Britain's interest in promoting the
22 expansion of world trade, from their vantage point the problem was less
.ry pressing. They were willing to participate in discussions of international
economic policy only as part of a general settlement. While Herbert
in Hoover and his Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes, expressed an
ce interest in convening in what the President termed a 'real honest-to-God
•ns economic conference' designed to reestablish fixed exchange rates,
he international convertibility and free international movement of corn-
ng modities and gold, they evinced little enthusiasm for meetings like those at
cit Genoa which seemed likely to concentrate on stop-gap measures to be
adopted in lieu of balanced budgets or Reparations settlements, and whose150 Barry Eichengreen
success appeared to hinge on American concessions regarding war debts.26
In the end, Hughes agreed only to send to the Conference as an unofficial ear
observer the American Ambassador to Rome, Richard Washburn Child, ad
In contrast to the Americans, the French sought to define the agenda sid
for Genoa as narrowly as possible. The French opposed British proposals
for universal adoption of nondiscrimination in trade and the most- sul
favored-nation clause, so they sought to discourage discussion of a general be
convention on trade policy. In contrast they pressed for discussion of pre
sanctions against the Soviet Government on the question of prewar be
debts.27 This dispute intensified after January 1922, when Briand's wo
relatively moderate government was replaced by a more nationalistic the
administration headed by Poincaré, who commenced almost immediately cui
to spar over these issues and Reparations with the equally combative sta
Lloyd George. Poincaré was skeptical about the usefulness of multilateral eni
negotiations and agreed to participate in the conference only on British '4
assurancesthat France's position on Reparations, the terms of the Treaty usel
of Versailles, and the Russian Imperial Government's debt to France alt4l
would not be questioned.28
The monetary proposals discussed at Genoa originated with the British
delegation. In drafting their proposals the British could draw on the First by
Interim Report of the Cunliffe Committee and on the considerable talents ex
of their monetary specialists, notably Ralph G. Hawtrey, since 1919
Director of Financial Enquires at H.M. A number of Britain's M
Genoa proposals resembled the Cunliffe Committee's recommendations, go
including the argument that a credible commitment to financial stability Otfil
required a return to gold.3° Resurrecting the gold standard, it was stated,
required balancing government budgets, insulating central banks from fort
pressure to extend credit to government agencies, and consolidating fort
national debts. Little was novel in these ideas. More novel were the
measures first proposed by the Cunliffe Committee and incorporated into
the British proposals to economize on the demand for monetary gold: these coil
included eliminating internal circulation of gold coin, concentrating gold InSi
reserves at the central bank, and permitting domestic residents to acquire NaJ
coinand bullion for export only from the authorities. By limiting the use I
ofgold to international settlements, the Cunliffe Committee and the British all
delegates at Genoa sought to minimize competing demands for reserves.
The British draft was circulated among foreign authorities in February thC
1922, and in March experts from Belgium, France, Italy and Japan met to
with British representatives in London to undertake revisions. These
proposals were adopted with only slight modification by the Financial
Committee at the Genoa Conference in April and by the Conference itself
inMay.3' sta
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26 TheGenoa resolutions contained a number of provisions designed to
ease the transition to gold. These included the recommendation, ultimately
adopted, that governments with significantly depreciated currencies con-
d
sider stabilizing at a lower rate of exchange. While accepting the argument
that prewar parities provided the ideal basis for stabilization, the experts
st- suggested that countries which had experienced sustained inflation might
ral be well advised to avoid the output costs associated with restoring the
of prewar level of prices. Moreover, they observed that governments would
var be seriously burdened by the increased real value of internal debt which
d's would result from a substantial reduction in prices.32 Policymakers were
therefore encouraged to stabilize at rates not far distant from those
— currently prevailing. Significantly for the operation of the interwar gold
lye standard, no sanctions were included to discourage governments from.
engaging in competitive depreciation.
ish The Genoa resolutions also contained proposals to economize on the
use of gold. The measures proposed by the Cunliffe Committee were
nce altered to meet what the British experts regarded as mounting deflationary
pressures. Resolution 9 on currency adopted by the Financial Commission
ish urged governments to establish a mechanism to minimize the need for gold
irst by 'maintaining reserves in the form of foreign balances, such as the gold
nts exchange standard, or an international clearing system.'
19 It was in this connection that the issue of policy coordination was raised.
Monetary authorities were encouraged to coordinate their demands for
gold and to avoid the wide fluctuations in internal prices that would
lity otherwise result from the 'simultaneous and competitive efforts of a
ed number of countries to secure metallic reserves.'33 Thus, central banks were
om for the first time explicitly urged to desist from the competitive struggle
ing for gold. These proposals for international cooperation were predicated
the upon the establishment of central banks where they did not exist and on
their insulation from political influence or control. Thus, at Genoa
ese countries with relatively stable currencies were therefore urged to adopt
old institutional arrangements similar to those imposed by the League of
tire Nations upon countries undergoing hyperinflat"n.
use The only resolution on international policy coordination acceptable to
ish all the participating countries was one couched in general terms. While
es. consultation and collaboration were encouraged, no formal mechanism for
ary their practice was specified. Instead, the Bank of England was requested
net to call an early meeting of central bankers to prepare a convention to
ese implement these measures. An accompanying resolution warned that the
success of any such plan was contingent upon the participation of the
;elf United States. In the words of the Financial Commission, no scheme for
stabilizing prices 'can be fully effective without coordination of policy152 Barry Eichengreen
between Europe and the United States, whose cooperation therefore
should be invited.'34 rec
There is no question that the economic costs of noncooperative be- to
haviour were clearly understood in 1922. Permitting central banks to a
engage in a competitive struggle for gold was seen as threatening to trans- be!
mit deflationary pressures to the world economy and delaying recovery bec
from the War. Multilateral negotiations were seen as the most effective
technique for achieving agreement on an acceptable international distri-
bution of reserves. Yet it was far from apparent how agreement on this III
matter might be reconciled with national autonomy on the question of the
level at which to stabilize exchange rates, or how these noble sentiments
might be institutionalized. But if the participants in the Genoa Conference cle
lacked a coherent view of how policy coordination might be practiced, they lay
agreed on the principle of responding cooperatively to international sta
financial problems. wF
Ultimately, even this modest attempt to provide a framework for thi
cooperation proved to be overly ambitious. To the surprise of the adj
participants, the next step in the process, namely the proposed meeting of les
central banks, was never held. The Bank of England took the initiative of wi
discussing the proposed meeting with the Federal Reserve, whose partici- fai
pation was endorsed by the US State Department. Once the Bank of
England's Committee of Treasury approved the tentative invitation of
drafted by Norman and Benjamin Strong, a meeting seemed imminent.35 ca
However, efforts to convene the meeting met with political obstacles, and mi
the prospective conference was soon reduced to a mere bargaining chip
to be used in disputes over these other concerns. The French ruled out their
participation unless Reparations were again excluded from the agenda. co
The Americans objected that meaningful progress could not be made an
unless the Reparations question was reopened. In the autumn of 1922 so
Britain sent a delegation to Washington to discuss funding the British war
debt, and the Bank of England's involvement in these negotiations again to
postponed the meeting of central bankers. France's occupation of the Ruhr of
in 1923 cast doubt on participation, and the financial difficulties
of Austria and Hungary were the occasion for further delay. By the summer be
of 1923, enthusiasm for a general convention of central banks had
dissipated. This was not to mark the end of financial collaboration, but
subsequent exchanges between central banks took place primarily on a
bilateral basis.38
With the failure of the Genoa Conference to yield even a general an
framework for international policy coordination, many of the dangers no
cited by the financial experts quickly came to pass. There were no sanctions sol
to discourage governments from stabilizing at parities which yielded aT
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re system of misaligned exchange rates. There was no mechanism for
reconciling the competing objectives of national monetary authorities nor
to prevent central banks from engaging in what was characterized as
to a competitive scramble for gold. The implications of noncooperative
behavior within the framework of the interwar gold standard would
ry become evident soon enough.
ye
ri- III. Leadership and Cooperation Under the Interwar Gold Standard
•ais
he A. Motivation
Establishing a basis for cooperation among central banks was
tce clearly one of the principal goals of the policymakers who attempted to
ey lay the foundation for the gold standard's resurrection. Yet the gold
standard is typically portrayed as a self-equilibrating mechanism under
which external balance is restored to deficit and surplus countries alike
through the smooth operation ofan anonymously functioning international
•he adjustment mechanism. The very concept of conflicting objectives, much
of less strategies such as leadership and cooperation, are wholly incompatible
of with familiar attempts to model the gold standard's operation. These
ci- familiar models are simply incapable of addressing the questions at hand.
•of The purpose of this section is therefore to develop an alternative model
on of the gold standard with which the issues of leadership and cooperation
can be addressed. No attempt is made to capture the operation of the
nd international gold standard in all its complexity, for this is not the model's
lip purpose. Its purpose israther to provide a simple macroeconomic
eir framework which highlights the channels through which the actions of one
La. country's central bank impinge upon the internal and external position of
de another and the incentives that these repercussion effects provide the
22 second country to respond to the actions of the first.It strips away
•ar complications in order to lay bare the dynamics of strategic interaction and
in to explore the implications of long-standing arguments about the benefits
hr of leadership and cooperation during the interwar period.
es The model is based on the notion that the interwar gold standard can
icr be viewed as an 'international struggle for gold.'37 Simply put, central
ad banks in our model desire incompatibly large shares of the world's gold
ut reserves. This provides the basis for conflicting objectives and for strategic
• a interaction.
Despite its simplicity, the model generates several useful insights. As in
any strategic game in which the players hold conflicting objectives,
:rs noncooperative behavior has economic costs compared with cooperative
ns solutions.38 In our model, central banks incapable of coordinating their
• a policies set their discount rates at undesirably high levels, putting downward154 Barry Eichengreen
pressure on the level of prices and depressing incomes at home and abroad.
h For example, this is the result at the Nash solution to this noncooperative
C
game. While central bank policy was but one factor at work in the world
0
economy in the 1920s, this result is suggestive when applied to a period
CO
marked by historically high discount rates, conflicts among central banks,
and steady deflation culminating in a Great Depression.
I
The Stackelberg leader-follower solution to the two-country model
provides a halfway point between the Nash and cooperative equilibria.
ba Compared to the Nash solution, the leader-follower solution isless an
deflationary and yields higher incomes both at home and abroad. Barring de cooperation, the exercise of leadership clearly is in the interest of both
rat
players; the question is whether either player will choose to exercise it. In
fact, there is an incentive for both players to resist the leadership role. It
is a standard (and perfectly intuitive) property of models of symmetrical
le
countries that both players prefer to adopt the same strategy. We show
below that the same holds true in a model of asymmetric countries, where defi
one central bank has exceptional power to influence the direction of
international capital flows. disI
In structure the model has much in common with previous analyses of
policy coordination (see for example Hamada, 1976 and 1979).It rest
incorporates the assumption that each central bank has more targets than fee
instruments, forcing it to confront the tradeoff between its objectives. This
is the assumption of instrument scarcity in whose absence problems of m
strategy vanish. In addition, it incorporates the assumption that each
domestic target variable is affected by the actions of the foreign central
bank. This is the assumption of interdependence.
There exists scope for strategic interaction in a model of the gold de
standard only if central banks can exercise discretion. We will assume that as
central banks are able to engage in discretionary initiatives to alter the
composition of the monetary base through open market operations or
changes in fiduciary circulation and to affect the size of the money mai
multiplier through changes in discount rates. While the idea that changes
in central bank discount rates affect the relationship between the gold Bril
reserve and the money supply is a departure from textbook treatments of Bril
the gold standard, it captures the fact that the authorities were capable in to
the short run of either reinforcing the impact of incipient gold flows on
domestic financial markets or neutralizing them through sterilization. In
fact, under the gold standard there were important sources of slack in the
connection between gold reserves and broadly defined monetary aggregates. ma
Central banks could hold gold in excess of that required to back notes in hal'
circulation, enabling them to intervene in financial markets with purchases for
of bonds and bills and to alter the monetary base without any accompanying cauInternational coordination in historical perspective 155
d. change in reserves. Only the need to maintain confidence in the convertibility
we of the currency placed limits on their discretionary actions. Similarly,
Id commercial banks, even if free of statutory reserve requirements, had an
)d incentive to hold precautionary reserves to guard against unanticipated
Cs, withdrawals. The size of such precautionary reserves was determined in
part by the cost of feasible alternatives, including discounting (in the
lel British case, via discount houses) at the central bank. Under the British
ia. banking system, there was a conventional ratio between a bank's cash
and its liabilities which was basically the same whether those liabilities were
ng demand or time deposits. Nonetheless, the authorities could influence this
ratio and hence affect broadly defined monetary aggregates through
—In changes in the deposit multiplier.39 This was even more true of the
It countries of the Continent, where there was typically no conventional or
• legal relation between reserve assets and deposits.
Each central bank in our model minimizes a quadratic loss function
ere defined over gold reserves and domestic prices. Although the historical
of record suggests that central bankers followed rules of thumb when setting
discount rates, we adopt the assumption of optimizing behavior as a
of simplifying device. The assumption that each bank has an optimal gold
It reserve is motivated by the observation that, while a central bank could
an feel more confident of its ability to defend the convertibility of the currency
his with a larger gold reserve on hand, it was less profitable to hold barren
of metal than interest-bearing financial assets.4°
Lch The idea that central banks maintained a target level for prices is another
ral simplifying assumption. Occasionally it is argued that central banks were
concerned ultimately with the domestic currency price of gold and that they
)ld desired only to prevent such fluctuations in prices and economic activity
iat as might threaten convertibility. By this interpretation, the price level is
:he properly viewed not as an independent goal of policy but as an intermediate
or target whose achievement was helpful for attaining the ultimate objective:
iey maintaining convertibility. Yet central banks were under pressure through-
out the interwar years to respond actively to internal conditions. The
1d British case provides an illustration of the pressures brought to bear.
of British central bankers were publicly cautious when relating their policy
in to the state of the domestic economy. According to Montagu Norman, the
• Ofl Bank of England's interwar Governor, the ill effects of a high Bank Rate
In on domestic industry and trade were greatly exaggerated and 'more
:he psychological than real.'4' Of course, by 1930, when this statement was
es. made, the Bank has been subjected to Treasury criticism for more than
Ifl half a decade; in 1924, a more relaxed time, Norman has expressed concern
SeS for the impact of monetary deflation on the state of the economy.4' The
ng caution that characterized the Bank's public pronouncements by the end156 Barry Eichengreen
of the decade can be seen as a response to the criticism to which it was gt
subjected. Keynes' articles on monetary policy are the best-known examples
of the genre.43 Surely, however, the Bank of England was more profoundly or
affected by criticism emanating from H.M. Treasury. The principal goals al
of Treasury policy in the twenties were to retire outstanding debt and to
reduce the burden of debt service charges through conversion of the five re
per cent government loans of 1917 at low interest rates. Debt service had to
risen from 11 per cent of central government spending in 1913 to 24 per m
cent in 1920 and more than 40 per cent by the end of the decade.44 Hence U
between 1925 and 1929 the Treasury consistently objected to Bank of
England initiatives which raised the price and reduced the availability of
credit. These objections were often communicated to the Bank directly. For
example:
w
The Governor of the Bank called at the Treasury on the 2nd December ra
[1925] about 7:15 pm, and informed me that there was every probability sh
that the Bank Rate would be increased.. .1 reported this to the Chancellor de
on the following morning and he at once telephoned to the Governor that ra
if the rate was raised, he would have to inform the House that it had been
done without his being consulted and against his wishes. It was not fair
to the Exchequer that action should be taken which affected all its affairs
without an opportunity being given to him to consider it. He expressed
an earnest request that action should be deferred at any rate for a week, w
to enable this to be done.45 0
Whatever the central bankers' beliefs about the effects of monetary
policy, it is difficult to dispute that such pressures would have encouraged
them to act as if they were concerned about the state of industry and trade.
Infact, Bank of England reaction functions for the period 1925—31 indicate.
some sensitivity of discount rate policy to the state of the domestic
economy.46 In what follows, the target of a stable price level can be thought
of as shorthand for stable prices, output and employment and, depending
on the reader's interpretation of the historical literature, different weights
can be attached to internal and external targets without greatly affecting an
the results. be
pr
B. Specification . . .
. co,
Consider a world of two identical countries, home and foreign.47
We log-linearize all relationships and use lower case letters to denote the
logs of the variables represented by the corresponding upper case letters, sh
except for interest rates which are always measured in levels. Each country th
has a model supply M, which can be thought of as an MI or M2 measure.
This aggregate is the product of the monetary base and the money an
multiplier V. The base is made up of domestic credit and the central bank's anInternational coordination in historical perspective 157
goldreserves. The domestic credit component of the base can be positive
as or negative, depending on whether central banks hold excess gold reserves
or there is a fiduciary issue outstanding. However, to simplify the model we
abstract entirely from the domestic credit component of the base.48
We assume that a rise in the discount rate, by increasing the cost of
ye rediscounting at the central bank, induces the consolidated banking sector
ad to hold a larger ratio of precautionary reserves to liabilities. Hence the
• money multiplier depends negatively on the central bank discount rate.




where v is the elasticity of the money supply with respect to the discount
• rate r.denotes the log of the world stock of monetary gold, of which
shares h and (I —h) are held by the domestic and foreign countries. The






ek, where p anddenote logs of domestic and foreign prices respectively.
Only mathematical complexity is added by assuming that nominal balances
are deflated by a consumer price index comprised of domestic and foreign
try prices.





;ht y*(p*) =y*p* J
ng
its where for convenience we assume constant elasticities of supply (y and
ng and standardize the normal level of output to unity. These functions can
be thought of as the short-run supply curves of an aggregation of
profit-maximizing firms confronting predetermined wages or material
costs. Rather than introducing costs explicitly, we simply note that the
classical full employment model (y == 0)and the Keynesian income-
he expenditure model (yy* -+cc)can be treated as special cases. The
rs,
• short-runfocus of the model should be borne in mind in the discussion
•ry that follows.
re. Aggregate demand depends positively on the relative price of imports
ey and negatively on the interest rate. The exchange rate is normalized to unity




We close the model with the open interest parity condition on the
assumption that nonmonetary assets denominated in the two currencies
are perfect substitutes and capital is perfectly mobile.
(5)
The omission of gold production, wealth effects and dynamics of
adjustment, to mention but a few complications, is obvious. Many of these
complications could be appended to the model. However, our intent here
is not to build a complete model but to present a simple analytical
framework containing the essential ingredients for the study of a particular
historical episode.
We now posit an objective function for each country of the form:
U =— [(p—p)2+a(h — (6)
whereis the weight attached to gold reserves relative to prices, output
and employment.49 We assume /i>to capture the idea that the two
countries prefer incompatibly large shares of the (log of the) world's stock ai
of monetary reserves —inother words, that the gold standard can be d
characterized as a competitive struggle for gold. It will be convenient to tI
normalizetozero. ft
Toderive a semi-reduced form expression for h, we set each country's
money supply equal to its money demand and take the difference of these c
two relations. (
h=1/(2g)[g+v(r_r*)+(l (7)
Setting aggregate supply (3) equal to aggregate demand (4) and substi-
tuting each country's money supply and money demand equations [(1) and







It is evident that this model provides the minimal ingredients for a study
of interdependence. The first element we require for an analysis of
interdependence is that each central bank faces a tradeoff between its target













4.1 The home country's objective function
and similarly for the foreign country. A rise in the domestic discount rate
decreases the domestic money multiplier, putting downward pressure on
the price level, and by reducing domestic money supply relative to domestic
money demand attracts gold from the foreign country.
The second element we require is that the target variables in the home
country are affected by the actions of the foreign central bank. Again from
(7) and (8):
3h —v v —=—<O
2 ar* 2
An increase in the foreign discount rate reduces the foreign money
multiplier and the foreign money supply, attracting gold from the home
country and depressing the world price level. Analogous results hold for
the foreign country.
Itis worth noting we have here a case of positive international
transmission. Initiating an expansionary policy in one country leads to
expansion in the other. This result contrasts with the assumption often
made about international transmission between the wars: that policy was
'beggar-thy-neighbor' in the sense that expansion in one country caused
contraction in the other. The contrast is due to the way we model the
international monetary regime: in this model of the 1920s with fixed
exàhange rates international transmission is positive, while in a comparable
model of the 1930s with flexible rates, transmission might well be negative.
The choices confronting central banks can be illustrated with two
h


















































4.2Home and foreign policy reaction curves
familiar diagrams. From (9), we know that, given r*,thedomestic central
bank can vary rtoattain different combinations of handp. In Figure 4.1,
the frontier of feasible combinations is labelled A'A. The optimal setting
for risone which achieves an h —p combination tangent to an indifference
curve at the point labelled F.
Consider now a rise in r.Thisshifts the AA frontier inward to A'A'.
The home country's central bank, faced with a smaller world money
supply, is forced to accept lower prices, smaller gold reserves, or a
combination of the two. As drawn, it moves to a point such as D tangent
to a less desirable indifference curve where both prices and reserves have
fallen.
The same exercises can be conducted for the foreign central bank. The
analysis becomes interesting once we combine the two banks' problems and
consider their interaction. This can be done by transposing the indifference
curves to r— r* spaceas in Figure 4.2. We read off from Figure 4.1 the
home country's rankings of different combinations of the two discount
rates. Thus, point E in Figure 4.2 at the center of the home country's solid
indifference curves corresponds to point E in Figure 4.1. The fact that the
foreign central bank's indifference curves lie to the northwest of the home
central bank's indifference curves reflects the assumption that the two
central banks ideally wish to hold incompatibly large shares of the world's
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goldstock. This is accomplished when each bank's discount rate is high
relative to that of its rival.
The downward sloping pp locus depicts combinations of randr*for
which a price level p obtains. Along parallel lines below and to the left of
pp. prices are higher, while above and tc the right, prices are lower. With
symmetry, the two central banks share a common rank ordering over prices
and the pp line has a slope of —45 degrees.
The F and F* curves in Figure 4.2 are the reaction functions of the two
central banks. The Fcurve, representing loss-minimizing discount rates for
the home central bank given the foreign discount rate, is the locus of points
where the tangent to the home indifference curve is horizontal. Similarly,
the F* curve is the locus of points where the tangent to a foreign
indifference curve is vertical. The reaction functions may be positively
sloped, as in Figure 4.2, or negatively sloped. The slopes can be derived
by substituting the semi-reduced forms for h and p into the objective








ce Both reaction functions will be positively sloped when the weight attached
to gold reserves w is large relative to that placed on prices. Then each
central bank responds to a foreign discount rate increase by raising its own
rate, attempting to stem the loss of gold reserves at the cost of still lower
a prices. Conversely, both reaction functions will be negatively sloped when
nt the weight put on gold reserves is relatively small. In this case, each country
responds to a discount rate increase abroad by lowering its discount rate,
attempting to reduce the fall in prices at the cost of still lower gold reserves.
ie So long as stability is maintained (as can be shown to obtain under
symmetry and under other cases considered below), the analysis is
essentially the same.
The discussion to follow will concentrate on the configuration depicted
in Figure 4.2. The case of upward-sloping reaction functions, in which each
id country is inclined to respond to a change in the foreign discount rate in






We can now determine the equilibrium values of r and r* under b
different solution concepts. After discussing the outcome under different of
assumptions, we will ask the question of which solution is likely to obtain, pa
First, we consider the model's Nash solution at the intersection of the
reaction functions. Note that in the symmetrical model the two discount th
rates are identical at the Nash solution, so the level of prices and reserves pri
will be the same in each country. In particular, since p at the Nash ra
solution, we can cancel the second additive term in equation (9) when do
solving for its characteristics. Differentiating the objective function with ou
respect to each discount rate under the assumption that the other discount sir




where the N subscript denotes the Nash solution. Le
Second, we consider the cooperative solution. Under symmetry, each
country holds exactly half the world's monetary gold, and prices are again
identical in the two countries. The best they can then do is to set their ab
discount rate equal to one another at the level consistent with p =0.
Setting (9) equal to zero yields: In
(14)
where the C subscript denotes the cooperative solution. From (13) and (14), is
rN > rc so long as h> sy
Under symmetry, the Nash and cooperative solutions yield identical Sti
distributions of gold. However, under the assumption of Nash behavior, th
the desire of rival banks to possess incompatibly large shares of the world's ca
gold stock causes both banks to elevate their discount rates above the level
consistent with price level p. Each is subject to the misapprehension that SO!
a marginal increase in its discount rate will secure it larger gold reserves ha'
at the cost of a relatively small decline in prices. In fact, each discount rate
increase elicits an increase in the foreign discount rate, yielding the
initiating bank no additional gold reserves but resulting in still lower prices. CO
Thus, the strategic interaction of central banks imparts a deflationary bias
to the world economy, given only the assumption that evj
Finally, we consider the case where the home country acts as Stackelberg
leader and the foreign country follows. Substituting the foreign country's 51(
reaction function into the home country's objective function and minimizing SU
the loss yields the solution depicted at point Mm Figure 42, where a home paInternational coordination in historical perspective 163
indifference curve is tangent to the foreign reaction function. The home
country's central bank recognizes that if it lowers its discount rate the
foreign central bank will respond in kind. Hence, it is aware that the loss
er of gold reserves brought about by its discount rate. reduction will be
partially offset by the reduction in the foreign discount rate, and that the
response of the foreign central bank will yield further benefits by reinforcing
nt the tendency of lower discount rates to raise the world money supply and
'es price level. The leader-follower strategy yields a lower domestic discount
sh rate than the Nash solution, resulting in a higher level of utility for the
domestic country, whose loss of gold is more than offset by higher prices,
ith output and employment. The foreign central bank benefits on both counts,
—tnt since prices are higher and it now obtains a larger share of the world's gold
stock.5°
In this model, the strategic interaction of central banks imparts a
3) deflationary bias to the world economy, assuming only that at the
I
optimumthey desire incompatibly large shares of the world's gold stock.
• Leadership has advantages over other noncooperative strategies: a country
ch which takes its foreign rival's reaction into account can initiate a reduction
in discount rates, raising prices and stimulating activity at home and
eir abroad. Cooperation has further advantages over leadership: through
cooperation both discount rates can be lowered and the deflationary bias
in monetary policy can be eliminated.
14) D. Sustainable Strategies
To this point we have not addressed the question of which solution
4) is likely to obtain. In this section we first consider this question using the
symmetrical model of previous sections which is intended to represent the
strategic interaction of two or more comparable financial centers during
Dr. the interwar years. We then extend the analysis to a simple assymmetrical
i's case intended to capture aspects of the prewar situation.
iel Assuming that cooperative strategies are not feasible,is the Nash
at solution or the Stackelberg leader-follower solution likely to obtain? We
'es have noted that both countries benefit with movement from the Nash
tte solution to the leader-follower solution. It is clear also that with upward-
he sloping reaction functions the follower reaps the greater gains: while both
es. countries benefit from higher prices, only the follower benefits from a larger
ias gold reserve. In Figure 4.2, the gains from discount rate reductions are
evenly distributed among countries as they move down the 45 degree line
toward the origin. Since the leader-follower solution is on the follower's
y's side of that line, the leader reaps the smaller benefits. As Cooper (1984)
ng suggests, the fact that the follower reaps the larger benefits encourages both
me parties to engage in a game of 'chicken,' each attempting to force the other164 BarryEichengreen
to accept the role of leader. There may be extended periods when the Nash
solution is observed as this game of 'chicken' is being played out. Clearly P
this is one way to interpret statements to the effect that the interwar 1 monetary system was characterized by the absence of leadership.
We might attempt to capture the change in structure of international
financial markets between the end of the 19th century and the interwar
0
periodby adding to the model an asymmetry in the ability of discount rates
to influence international capital flows. Assume that the discount rate of
the domestic central bank (which might be thought of as the Bank of
ce
England) has a larger impact than the foreign discount rate on the domestic
money supply (i.e., that=Ovwhere 0 <0 <1).In all other respects, ta
including objective functions, the two countries remain the same. Since
reC
from (9) and (10) = the domestic discount rate has a larger
impact than the foreign discount rate on the international distribution pe
of gold. at
Strikingly, introducing this asymmetry into the model does not alter the
fact that, in the case of positively-sloped reaction functions, each country
prefers its foreign counterpart to play the Stackelberg leader. The intuition EJ
is straightforward. For simplicity of exposition, consider the case where
v is unchanged from sub-sections B and C above butis now smaller.
Since v" =Ov,we can rewrite equation (1) for the foreign country as:
m*=_vor*+(I_h)g (1')
and leave the rest of the model unchanged. In this case, the model and its
solutions are the same, except we can think of the foreign central bank
as setting and the domestic central bank as reacting to Or* rather than r*. d
At each solution, the domestic discount rateisthe same as in the def
symmetrical case, while the foreign discount rate is simply 0 times its value
in the symmetric model. In r_Or* space, the various solutions could be
depicted by the symmetrical diagram of Figure 4.2. In r —r*space, the slope
of each reaction function would have to be multiplied by 1/0. All of the
conclusions from the symmetric model concerning the gains to Stackelberg
leaders and followers continue to hold. of
The simple asymmetrical model suggests, therefore, that to the extent
that the Bank of England had more power than its foreign counterparts Jaq:
over the direction of gold flows, this would not have encouraged it to
exercise leadership in the Stackelberg sense. If asymmetries in economic
structure are to provide an explanation for the Bank of England's an
leadership role, they must be more subtle than the simple asymmetry
considered here. de
De
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IV Thetripartitemonetary agreement of 1936 and the role for cooperation
The devaluation of sterling in 1931 marked the end of the truly international
gold standard of the interwar years. The Bank of England had succeeded
al in holding sterling between the gold points during the period 1925—1930
ar only under considerable duress. The onset of the Great Depression then
es placed a downward pressure on prices, pushed the government budget into
of deficit and by the summer of 1931 raised unemployment rates to 20 per
of cent of the insured labor force. Following financial crises in Austria and
tic Germany and with the Labour and National Government's inability to
ts, take convincing steps either to balance the budget or to initiate economic
ice recovery, defense of the sterling parity was abandoned in September.
Against the dollar and the currencies of other countries that continued to
•on peg to gold, the pound depreciated by 25 per cent, from $4.86 to $3.75
at the end of the first week of floating.
he More than two dozen countries allowed their currencies to depreciate
try with sterling, among them most of the Empire, Scandinavia, and Eastern
on Europe.5' Germany for its part adopted draconian exchange controls and
moved increasingly toward a system of bilateral clearing arrangements
er. with its Eastern European trading partners.
The United States broke with gold in 1933. In March, Roosevelt
I') restricted foreign exchange dealings and gold and currency movements,
and in April he issued an executive order requiring individuals to deliver
its their gold coin, bullion and certificates to Federal Reserve Banks. At this
nk point, the dollar began to float. By setting a series of progressively higher
r*. dollar prices for gold,the Administration engineered a significant
he devaluation. The dollar was finally stabilized in January 1934 at $35 an
ue ounce, 59 per cent of its former gold content. The only major currencies
be that remained freely convertible were those of the Gold Bloc countries:
pe France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, Poland and Switzerland. These countries
he were willing to go to great lengths to defend their established parities.
rg Thus, the international monetary system of the mid-1930s was a hybrid
of different regimes. Britain was engaged in a managed float administered
nt by the Exchange Equalization Account (EEA). The United States in
rts January 1934 pegged the dollar to gold at the new $35 price but extended
to convertibility only to countries on the gold standard. France, under the
provisions of the monetary law of 1928, was fully on the gold standard
i S and obligated to buy and sell gold without limit at the prevailing price.
try As late as the summer of 1936 the official goal of French policy was to
defend and maintain the franc Poincaré. Despite the depth of the
Depression, the Bank of France continued to respond to gold losses by
raising its discount rate. Belgium's devaluation in 1935 served to signal the
• •a
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extent of the franc's overvaluation, and confidence was further undermined fu
by political developments abroad, including Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, es
Germany's occupation of the Rhineland, and the outbreak of the Spanish a
Civil War. With the formation of Leon Blum's Popular Front Government
in April 1936, pressure on the franc intensified. Blum was pledged to de
stimulate domestic activity while at the same time maintaining the gold L
standard parity.52 Market participants were aware of the incompatibility ag
of these objectives. Blum's proposals had included public works and public
employment, a reduction in the length of the work week, paid holidays,
universal collective bargaining, and public control of heavy industry and imi
finance. French labor initiated sit-down strikes soon after the election to th
induce speedy implementation of these measures, and the Bank of France's exc
gold reserves plummeted as a result of capital outflows. The Bank dir
responded by raising its discount rate to 6 per cent, three times the Bank
of England's rate. Discreet consideration began to be given to the bu
possibility of devaluation.
As devaluation of the franc came to be seen as probable, French COl
policymakers considered how to capitalize on the situation and foreign
policymakers how to minimize the damage. Yet the French position was m
not without difficulties. One French objective was to devalue by a margin tia
adequate to secure a competitive advantage —inother words, devaluation to
on the 1920s model. At the same time, they were constrained by the be
necessity of not arousing the indignation of the electorate or their trading an
partners. Since the Popular Front had come to power committed to the fu
gold standard, it was desirable that devaluation occur as part of a sell
multilateral system of exchange rate adjustments which laid the basis for
a general return to gold. Moreover, given the spectre of 1923 and 1926,
the French were concerned that a substantial devaluation might cast doubt ra
on the credibility of any fixed parity and set off a vicious spiral of ex
depreciation. To allay speculation the French therefore proposed that go
realignment be followed by the establishment of new, more realistic gold
standard parities by the Bank of England, Bank of France and Federal Wa
Reserve. refl
In addition to the domestic political situation, the Popular Front had
reason to worry about foreign retaliation. Earlier in the decade, France
had imposed new commercial restrictions in response to foreign devaluation,
leaving her little diplomatic defense against the adoption of comparable
measures by the US and UK. Equally worrisome was the danger of Bli
competitive devaluation. There was no international code of conduct Au
governing the management of exchange rates. The British EEA could a
intervene with sales of sterling to push the pound down along with the sta
franc, and if 1933 was any indication the American response might be a LoInternational coordination in historical perspective 167
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furtherdevaluation of the dollar. Hence from the French perspective it was
essential before proceeding with devaluation to secure an agreement on
acceptable margins of adjustment.
sh For the British and Americans, the danger attached to a French
nt devaluation was that it was beggar-thy-neighbor policy. To the extent that
London and Washington viewed one another as inclined to. retaliate
against a French devaluation, each feared that its own competitive position
would be seriously eroded. Moreover, competitive devaluation would only
ic exacerbate exchange-rate instability and uncertainty, with a depressing
• impact on trade. For the British, the spectre of a French devaluation raised
the further possibility that London's complete control over the foreign
— exchangevalue of sterling would be compromised by French intervention es directed at other targets.
nk The US and UK engaged in sporadic negotiations in the spring of 1935,
he but to little effect since the Americans were primarily concerned to avoid
another round of competitive devaluation while the British were primarily
•ICh concerned to retain their freedom of action. Following the triumph of the
I PopularFront in 1936, channels of communication between the govern-
ments were reopened. The US continued to press for multilateral nego-
tiations over acceptable margins of adjustment, while the UK was willing
to go no further than to express its hope that the dollar-pound rate could
the be held steady so long as devaluation of the franc was moderate.53 Blum
ng and his ministers couched any discussion of devaluation in terms of a
the fundamental restructuring of the international monetary order. In early
a September the French proposed an agreement among the three govern-
br ments which would specify new bands for the franc, dollar and pound,
26 commit the three governments to collaborative efforts to maintain those
ibt rates, bind them not to devalue except by mutual agreement or under
of exceptional and unforeseen circumstances, and compel them to return to
iat gold convertibility once stability was restored.54
)ld The ambitious French proposal was coolly received in London and
ral Washington. The Americans were unwilling to commit to an eventual
return to gold or to stabilizing the dollar within a fixed band. Treasury
ad Secretary Morgenthau favored only a mechanism for collaboration among
ice the exchange equalization funds of the three countries and working
)fl, agreementsabout the management of rates. The British opposed even more
ble strongly any scheme which threatened to limit their freedom of action.55
of British officials hoped only that Blum and his Minister of Finance Vincent
Auriol would devalue the franc in a convincing yet moderate manner, by
aid a margin large enough to induce foreign capital inflows and permit
the stabilization but small enough to leave unaffected relations between
e a London and Washington.5°
j
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The French response to these objections was to drop their proposal for
fixed bands but to continue advocating an eventual return to gold.57 o:
However, the Americans and British continued to object to any mention la
of the gold standard. By the middle of September the French had begun
to recognize that the only agreement which might prove acceptable to both
London and Washington was one couched in very general terms.58 Auriol's
next proposal was for a single declaration by the three governments
pledging to avoid unilateral changes in exchange rates and unnecessary tc
trade restrictions.59 The Treasuries and central banks of the three countries a
were to agree to cooperate in managing the exchange markets either
through bilateral consultations or multilateral negotiations. This proved
an acceptable formula. However, to hasten their appearance, Morgenthau di
suggested substituting for a document signed by the three governments the ai
simultaneous issuing of separate statements once reference tothe
particularly contentious issues had been removed. g
With all reference to the gold standard and fixed parities eliminated, the a
Tripartite Declarations, much like the resolutions adopted at Genoa in ¶
1922, amounted basically to three simultaneous statements of willingness
to engage in consultations among Treasuries and central banks.6° No in
formal mechanism for actually coordinating policies was specified in the
documents. Nevertheless, these declarations were seen as essential to insure A
that the new level for the French franc would be defensible. Otherwise, c
competitive devaluations would be anticipated by the market and create 0
anticipationsof a further devaluation of the franc. In return for extending
this expression of cooperation so desired by the French, the Americans and
British hoped that they might be able to influence France's choice of parity H
and prevent an excessive devaluation.
Immediately upon the French devaluation of slightly more than 25 per tl4
cent and release of the declarations, continuous cooperation among the
exchange equalization funds and central banks of the three countries wi
commenced. Belgium embraced the principles of the agreement one day
later, and the Dutch and Swiss governments joined within a month. The
agreement was hailed by the press. As the New York Times put it, 'A streak bd
of sunlight had broken through the dark clouds of nationalism;
International cooperation was still possible.'6'
In contrast to the aftermath of the Genoa Conference, specific arrange- o4.
ments for day-to-day collaboration followed within a month. Under the
provisions of the Gold Agreement Act of October 1936, exchange rates in
were agreed to daily and the three exchange funds cooperated in market ra
intervention, deciding on a common currency to be bought or sold and st
settling accounts daily in gold.62 In this respect, the contrast with 1922 was pi
striking. Part of the explanation for the successful implementation of the hiInternational coordination in historical perspective 169
Tripartite Agreement lies in the fact that by 1936 the major political
obstacles to collaboration —notablyReparations and war debts —had
largely receded from view. At least as important, however, was explicit
recognition that the range of issues subject to collaboration would be
circumscribed and that nothing in the agreement threatened to undermine
l's each government's independence to formulate domestic policy.
its TheTripartite Declarations had warned that although 'in their policy
ry toward international monetary relations [governments] must take into full
jes account the requirements of internal prosperity, the constant object of their
policy is to maintain the greatest possible equilibrium in the system of
ed international exchange and avoid to the utmost extent the creation of any
—au disturbance by domestic monetary action.'63 From this statement it might
he appear that priority was attached to international policy coordination. In
he fact, however, internal balance was explicitly recognized as the paramount
goal of policy, and the maintenance of international stability was basically
he a useful ancillary target. As Beyen (1949, p. 112) suggests, policy coordi-
in nation was seen not as a positive objective of policy but as a negative
ess promise not to indulge in initiatives that might be overly disruptive to the
international monetary system.
:he The international monetary order that emerged from the Tripartite
ire Agreement placed great emphasis on consultation, but beyond efforts to
Se, coordinate day-to-day management of the markets placed few restraints
ate on independent action. It provided no mechanism for the formal coordi-
.ng nation of monetary or fiscal policies. Nothing in either agreement bound
nd the participating countries to set their exchange rates at current levels.
ity However, under the new arrangement the dollar began to emerge as the
link between gold and other currencies, a position it was to hold for more
er than two decades following the Second World War. The US was by no
:he means bound to stabilize its currency at $35toan ounce of gold, a price
ies which could be changed on 24 hours notice. But with the passage of time
.ay the Administration grew increasingly attached to this rate. With the dollar
'he fixed but adjustable in terms of gold and other currencies adjustable at the
ak beginning of each day in terms of the dollar, the system resembled a hybrid
of Bretton Woods (in terms of the relation between gold and the dollar)
and a crawling peg (in terms of the relationship between the dollar and
ge- other currencies).
the By the end of 1936, many of the recommendations put forward at Genoa
tes in 1922 had been implemented but, ironically, at the expense of exchange
ket rate stability. Consultation among governments and central banks, so
nd strongly recommended at Genoa, had been institutionalized under the
vas provisions of the Gold Agreement Act of October. Consultation extended
the however only to day-to-day management of exchange markets, national170 Barry Eichengreen
governments retaining complete discretion to set their external rates. The to
dollar-sterling rate was effectively pegged within a narrow band from the
French devaluation in 1936 until the second half of 1939, but the French th
engaged in several substantial devaluations in the second half of 1937 and lal
again in 1938. The gold economy measures urged at Genoa appeared in
the form of restrictions on the internal circulation of gold coin and bullion A
and measures to limit international flows to transactions between central
banks and stabilization funds. With the emergence of currency areas tei
centered upon New York, London and, to a lesser extent, Paris, the reserve tei
currency arrangement proposed at Genoa increasingly became a reality. pr
Indeed, to the extent that the dollar was the currency most tightly linked frt
to gold, it began to exhibit features of the unique role as an international an
reserve currency it was to take on after World War II. The role for policy
coordination lay in lending a semblance of order to the currency markets, m
insuring that retention of a link for gold was consistent with an adequate m
level of reserves, and discouraging beggar-thy-neighbor policy. The role in
for exchange rate flexibility was to provide governments with independence
of action. We will never know how long this system would have succeeded




Theinterwar period witnessed experiments with every modern international
monetary arrangement: clean floating in the first half of the twenties and
a gold exchange standard in the second, managed floating in the early
1930s, and after 1936 the reintroduction of a link with gold and a form
of adjustable peg. Whether the regime was based loosely on a system of
rules, as in the case of the gold standard, or placed few limits on the
discretion of the authorities, as in the. case of floating exchange rates,
policymakers harbored no illusions that the international monetary
arrangement alleviated the problem of interdependence. In each instance
they sought to insure exchange-rate and balance-of-payments stability by
establishing a framework conducive to international policy coordination.
A desire for policy coordination is by itself insufficient to insure
successful collaboration. The aftermath of the Genoa Conference, when
political obstacles impeded efforts to arrange a convention of central
banks, illustrates the pitfalls to successful implementation. Ultimately,
governments turned to noncooperative strategies within the framework of
the gold-exchange standard. The competitive struggle for gold and the
deflationary pressures that resulted indicated clearly the advantages of
3 cooperation. Therefore, when France's devaluation in 1936 'erased the last
vestiges of the interwar gold standard, policymakers once more attemptedNOTES
* Thispaper was written during visits to Stanford University and INSEE. I am
grateful to Paul David and Jacques Melitz for helpful discussions, and to the
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the French Ministry of Finance and the
Controller of H.M. Stationery Office for permission to refer to the Public
Records. The French Ministry of External Affairs provided financial support.
1For example, according to Beyen (1949, p. 28), 'Under a fully automatic
standard,' by which he means the prewar gold standard, 'the need for
consultation between central banks was, of course, limited.' He tells a story
which illustrates central bankers' attitudes toward policy coordination and
consultation. It seems to have been the tradition at the Netherlands Bank for
the President and the Directors to personally count the bank notes withdrawn
from circulation at a meeting held directly after lunch. One day in 1912 or 1913
two Directors of the Reichsbank paid a visit to Amsterdam, and the President
of the Bank had the novel idea of taking them to lunch. The conversation was
'highly interesting,' and the President arrived at the bank note meeting fifteen
minutes late with what he thought was an adequate excuse. The oldest of the
Directors was unappeased and commented, 'Your work ishere, not in
coffeehouses.'
2 Of course, parallel movements in discount rates could be consistent with the
rules of the game if all of the countries considered are either gaining or losing
gold to some other country not included in the discount rate comparison. See
the discussions in Bloomfield (1959), Morgenstern (1959) and Triffin (1964).
3 For the period of the classical gold standard (1880—1914), Bloomfield (1959)
calculates that central banks complied with the rules of the game only 34 per
cent of the time. Even the Bank of England, thought to be invested with special
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to establish a framework for coordinated action. On this occasion, not only
was the political situation opportune, but in contrast to earlier efforts
the negotiators carefully circumscribed the range of issues subject to col-
laboration and placed relatively few restrictions on each government' s
freedom of action. Hence the successful conclusions of the Tripartite
Agreement and the Gold Agreement Act.
What emerges clearly from this analysis of the interwar period is the
tension which pervades all efforts to coordinate economic policies —a
tension which is certainly evident also in the 1980s. Then as now the
problem for monetary coordination was how to reconcile the need for
freedom of action with the desire for order in foreign exchange markets
and with the recognition that national policies have international reper-
cussions. Then as now the institutional response was a hybrid international
monetary system combining arrangements for exchange market manage-
ment with autonomy of national policy, and placing a premium on
international policy coordination without providing a mechanism for
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responsibility for managing the system, adhered to the rules only 47 per cent 20
of the time. 21
4 For example, see the discussions of Bank of England —Bankof France loans
in Clapham (1944), volume 2, pp. 329—92 and Sayers (1936), Ch. 5. 22
5 The trans-Atlantic telephone was still used sparingly between the Wars. The 23
1936 interchange between Morgenthau and Cochran reported by Clarke (1977)
shows that the reason why the Transatlantic telephone was sparingly used was 24
that it was difficult to hear.
6 Moggridge (1972), Ch. 3. Thus, for example, in November 1921 the three 25
Scandinavian central banks informed the Bank of England that, however
desirous they were of returning to gold, they felt unable to commit to a parity
against gold and the dollar unless the UK did so first. The Americans were
aware of the problem; since Montagu Norman immediately sent a copy of the
confidential Scandinavian memorandum to Benjamin Strong, Governor of the 26
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. It is not surprising, then, that New York 27
saw Britain's return to gold as a joint operation. Clay (1957), pp. 14 1—2.
7 A comprehensive analysis would consider also the World Economic Conference
held in London in 1933. See Traynor (1949). 28
8 United Nations (1949), p.2. International comparisons are provided by
Edelstein (1981). 29
9 On the composition of international reserves before 1914, see Lindert (1969).
10 A typical statement of this conventional wisdom can be found in Cleveland 30
(1976), p. 17. As Keynes nostalgically described the prewar system from his
vantage point in 1930: 'In the latter half of the 19th century, the influence of 31
London on credit conditions throughout the world was so predominant that
the Bank of England could almost have claimed to be the conductor of the
international orchestra. By modifying the terms on which she was prepared 32
to lend.. .shecould to a large extent determine the credit conditions prevailing
elsewhere.' Keynes (1930), p. 274.
11 Macmillan Committee evidence of Sir Ernest Harvey, Question 7515, 2 July
1930, reprinted in Sayers (1976), volume 3, p. 205.
12 Committee of Finance and Industry (1931), p. 125.
13 See especially Triffin (1964) and the sympathetic discussion in Ford (1962).
14 It has proven difficult to extract from the historical record convincing evidence
in support of this theory. Attempts to plot the UK's terms of trade against
levels or first differences in Bank Rate have generally proven inconclusive. See
Moggridge (1972), pp. 12—13; Kenen (1960), p. 60; Lindert (1969), p. 44.
Moreover, a number of observers of the London money market (Moggridge,
1972; Brown, 1940) have argued that the volume of commercial bills discounted
to finance inventory carrying costs was insensitive to interest rate movements.
Hence we make no attempt to incorporate this potential asymmetry into the
model developed below.
IS Costigniola (1977), p. 1914 and passim; see also Parrini (1969).
16 Trade statistics can be found in Loveday (1931), p. 153. Current account
estimates are by the Bank of England from Sayers (1976), vol. 3, pp. 3 12—3.
17 Bouvier (1981), pp. 5—6.
33 18 Keynes (1931), p. 211; Macmillan Committee evidence of Sir Ernest Harvey.
34 Question 7515, 2 July 1930, reprinted in Sayers (1976), volume 3, p. 205.
35 19 League of Nations (1931), p. 17; Svennilson (1954), pp. 233—46.International coordination in historical perspective 173
20Moulton and Pasvolsky (1932), p. 431.
nt 21 For monthly statistics, see International Conference of Economic Services
(1934).
flS 22 For details, see Bergmann (1927).
23 The classic references are of course Keynes (1931) and Ohlin (1929). Recent
he discussions include Maier (1976) and Silverman (1982).
'7) 24 Public Record Office (PRO) Tl60/5, 'Export of Gold to America,' by
'as R. G. Hawtrey, 5 March 1923.
25 Certain accounts attribute great foresight to the British, suggesting that their
ree enthusiasm for the gold-exchange standard was part of a conscious strategy
of relaxing Britain's balance of payments constraint, rejuvenating the City of
itY London, and enhancing the Bank of England's control over international
ere markets. See Costigniola (1977), p. 917.
the 26 Costigniola (1977), P. 916, Traynor (1949), P. 72.
—the 27 Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mm. Aff. Etr.) B82/1 12,
rk 'Reunion Interministrielle au sujet de L'Equitable Traitement du Commerce,'
• 28 January 1922.
ice 28 See the interchange of memoranda between the French and British governments
b
in United Kingdom (1922).
•y 29 PRO T160/5, 'The Genoa Currency Resolutions,' by R. 0. Hawtrey,
4 February 1922. See also Hawtrey (1923).
30 See First Interim Report of Committee on Currency and Foreign Exchanges
After the War (1918).
tSf 31 The various drafts can be found in United Kingdom (1924), p. 59—63. The
•ht resolution of the Financial Commission and the Experts' Report appear in
Mills (1923).
red 32 To quote the Report of the Committee of Experts, 'The question of devaluation
in is one which must be decided upon by each country according to its view of
g its own special requirements. We think it important however to draw attention
ul to some of the considerations which will necessarily weigh with any country
y in coming to a decision on this question. There is a prevalent belief that a return
to pre-war gold parity is necessary or desirable for its own sake. There are
undoubtedly advantages to be obtained by such a return, but we desire to point
out that for countries where currency has fallen very far below the pre-war
nst parity, a return to it must involve social and economic dislocation attendant
;ee upon continuing readjustment of money-wages and prices, and a continual
increase in the burden of international debt. Regard being had to the very large
debts which have been incurred since the Armistice by many of the countries
concerned, we are inclined to think that a return to the old gold parity involves
too heavy a strain upon production. We repeat that the decision must be left
the in each case to the country concerned. ..' Mills(1923), p. 369. The French were
less enthusiastic than the British about endorsing the option of devaluation,
• perhaps due to the franc's weakness and the impact of such a position on
ant confidence. They supported devaluation only for cases where it was demons-
3 trably 'impossible' to return to the prewar parity. Mm. Fin. Etr. B 82-16/121,
Conference Financière, 11 April 1922.
ey 33 Resolution 9, reprinted in Mills (1923), p. 369.
34 Ibid, Resolution 10.
35 Clay (1957), p. 158.174 Barry Eichengreen
36 There were notable exceptions to this rule, such as the meeting held on Long
Island in 1927 among representatives of four major central banks. See
Eichengreen (1984). 50
37 The phrase comes from the interchange between Keynes and Norman before
the Macmillan Committee. See Question 3490, reprinted in Sayers (1976),
volume 3, p. 185. This idea was then adopted in much of the subsequent
literature. For example, Cassel (1936, P. 13) remarks usually, however, the
central banks themselves are responsible for the injurious increase in the
demand for gold insofar as they compete with one another in their endeavors
to strengthen their reserve.' 51
38 This ranking necessarily holds only when all the players contribute to the
cooperative solution. Thus, for example, cooperation between governments 52
can be welfare reducing in the absence of cooperation between a government
and the private sector. Rogoff (1983) provides an example of such an outcome.
39 British conventions regarding reserve ratios are discussed by Beyen (1949),
pp. 62—3. See also Balogh (1947). Cairncross and Eichengreen (1983) provide
evidence for Britain on the links between the discount rate and the money 54
multiplier. See especially Table A3. 1. 55
40 The Bank of England and the Bank of France remained privately held
institutions influenced still by the desire to pay customary dividends to
shareholders. While the extent to which the profit motive and public service
figured in the authorities' calculations remains difficult to discern, incorporating
the profit motive into models of central bank behavior is a step in the direction
of realism.
41 See Norman's Macmillan Committee evidence: Committee on Finance and 56
Industry (1931), Questions 3328—3517, 26 March 1930, reprinted in Sayers 57
(1976), volume 3, pp. 12—253.
42 For example, see Norman's statements to the Chamberlain-Bradbury Corn- 58
mittee in the summer of 1924, cited in Moggridge (1969), Ch. 2.
43 Formal statements for Keynes' view of the relationship of monetary policy to
the state of trade appear in Keynes (1930), while his efforts at pamphleteering 59
are collected in Keynes (1931). Keynes' most accessible account of the channels 60
of transmission came in his private evidence to the Macmillan Committee. See
Keynes (1981). 61
44 See Eichengreen and Giavazzi (1984). 62
45 PRO T176/13, Leith-Ross Memorandum, 3 December 1925.
46 See Eichengreen, Watson and Grossman (1985).
47 Extending the model to more than two countries adds generality but alters none
of the conclusions presented below. See Eichengreen (1984), Appendix B, where
a simple three-country model is analyzed. Note also that some implications of
relaxing the assumption of identical countries are explored below. 63
48 The model is readily adapted to the analysis of open market operations, and
many of the same conclusions follow. Again, see Eichengreen (1984). An
advantage of adding the domestic credit component of the monetary base to
the model is that it would permit domestic assets denominated in one country's R
currency to be held as international reserves by the other. Again, this adds
realism to the model but alters none of the conclusions presented below. Bal
49 This formulation, which places the stock of reserves in the authorities' objective
function, is in contrast to most previous specifications of policy coordination Ba:
problems, which typically assume that the authorities have a target balance of
payments surplus (i.e., a target for the flow change in reserves). As Niehans BeiInternational coordination in historical perspective 175
(1968) points out, the specification here would appear to make more sense in
a utility-maximizing framework.
50 In the case of negatively sloped reaction functions, the details and implications
re differ. The domestic central bank realizes that a rise in its discount rate will
5) elicit a reduction in the foreign discount rate, since the foreign country attaches
great weight to the stability of prices. The home country's gain from increased
•he reserves more than offsets any loss due to lower prices. In contrast, the foreign
he country is worse off and unwilling to play the follower. Since both countries
rs prefer to lead, the configuration will be unstable.
51 Hence the movement of the effective exchange rate was somewhat less
he pronounced; see Redmond (1980).
its 52 Opposition on the Left to the option of devaluation was based on a recognition
that devaluation would only work by reducing real wages, a result which was
viewed as unacceptable. Sauvy (1984), volume 1, p. 246.
9) 53 On the reopening of negotiations, see Sauvy (1984), vol.1, p. 270. On the
de different national objectives, see Clarke (1977), p. 25.
tey 54 Clarke (1977), p. 34.
55 This is precisely the way they put it to the French. Archives of the French
Ministry of Finance (Mm. Fin.) B32325, Letter from the Chancellor of the
to Exchequer, 14 September 1936. Another British concern, sometimes now heard
ice in connection with the European Monetary System, was that the establishment
ng of fixed bands for exchange rates would strengthen the position of speculators
by increasing the likelihood of adjustments in one direction, and thereby
increase rather than diminish speculative pressures. See Clarke (1977), p. 36.
nd 56 Drummond (1979), p. 9.
ers 57 Mm. Fin. B32325, Projet des note aux gouvernements Americain et Britan-
nique,' 8 September 1936.
• 58 PRO 1177/31 'Sir Warren Fisher for Mr. Morgenthau,' 14 September 1936,
in Telegraphic Correspondence Respecting the Devaluation of the Franc.
to Printed for the Foreign Office, September 1936.
ng 59 'Secretary of State to Chancellor of the Exchequer,' 20 September 1936, in ibid.
els 60 For the text of the three declarations, see Bank for International Settlements
;ee (1937).
61Restoring Monetary Order,' New York Times, 4 October 1936.
62 The exchange funds informed one another each morning of the currency in
which they proposed to deal. If the other parties agreed to the currency and
the rates, a gold price was specified at which each central bank would exchange
ne foreign currency for gold at the close of the business day. This price was subject
to change at the beginning of the next trading day. See PRO T177/33, 'Cypher
of Telegram to Mr. Mallet (Washington),' 7 October 1936.
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ra
This paper represents a very successful attempt to apply the perspectives a
of two distinct disciplines —historyand economics —tothe problem of w
international macroeconomic policy co-ordination. The period that is ir
studied, the years between the two world wars, is averyeventful one, and T
Professor Eichengreen's historical narrative alone makes this a worthwhile
paper. What stands out, however, is the careful and well-motivated
attempt to use simple formal economic theory and game theory to bring p4
out systematic features of the interwar experience and to draw conclusions it
for international policy coordination now and in the future.
One may disagree with the details of Eichengreen's attempt to model
the stylized facts of the interwar policy game. It must surely be agreed,
however, that unlike many attempts at an inter-disciplinary or multi-
disciplinary approach, where the whole turned out to be less than any single
constituent component, the contribution of the present paper is more than
the sum of its historical and economic parts.
The paper starts with a useful reminder that even during the 'classical'
gold standard years (1880—1913) the world was never blessed with an in'
efficient, quasi-automatic mechanism for coordinating the actions of
national monetary authorities. There is ample anecdotal evidence and quite
a bit of supporting statistical material on discount rate movements to r
support the view that the rules of the gold standard game were frequently 'r
flouted by central banks intent on neutralizing rather than accommodating w
or reinforcing the effects of their counterparts.International coordination in historical perspective 179
Theformal modelling exercise in Section IIIB, is intended to apply only
to the gold exchange standard in the second half of the twenties and
he possibly to the pre-1913 gold standard. It is not applicable to the fairly
free float of the early twenties and the managed floating of the early thirties.
A properly functioning gold standard corresponds to the Stackelberg
leader-follower solution in Eichengreen's model while the Pareto-inferior
nd Nash-Cournot equilibrium characterizes the competitive struggle for gold
fl: ofthe interwar gold exchange standard. Even the Stackelberg solution
has a deflationary or contractionary bias (relative to the cooperative
ay solution) as the two players boost their discount rates to attract a larger
'ar shareof the given world stock of gold. I like the outcome a bit better than
the inputs, but as there are certain to be many ways of generating the same
icy kinds of reaction functions and similar relationships between the Nash,
of Stackelberg and cooperative equilibria, this need not be a very serious
criticism.
Eichengreen uses a static, deterministic, linear-quadratic two player
game. The economic environment of the players is a two-country,
'Keynesian' IS-LM-aggregate supply curve model with a fixed exchange
rate and perfect capital mobility. Each country's monetary authority has
res a 'domestic' target price level and a 'external' target share of the fixed
of world stock of reserves. Having the price level rather than the rate of
is inflation as a target is necessitated by the static nature of the approach.
nd The choice of the price level rather than the level of output or employment
ile as the domestic target seems potentially misleading. Depending on the
ed source of the shock, the pursuit of price level stability through monetary
ng policy may increase output instability (the case of a supply shock) or reduce
ns it (the case of demand shock). I am also a bit worried about the authorities'
apparent ability to keep their discount rates systematically below or above
lel the market-determined interest rate.
When Eichengreen considers the asymmetric leader-follower game, the
ti- assumption is maintained that only gold functions as an international
reserve asset. The role of Sterling as a supplementary reserve asset for the
an 'follower' countries before World War Land the role of the US dollar after
World War II suggests a way of introducing asymmetries into the
behavioural equations of the model that may be superior to the differential
an impacts of discount rates on money supplies considered by Eichengreen.
of At the very beginning of the paper, reference is made to the view that
ite '...internationalpolicy coordination is most readily achieved under a
to rules-based regime rather than one that depends on discretion.' The words
Ely 'rules' and 'discretion' have been used and interpreted in many different
ng ways. In the context of dynamic game theory, policy behaviour is said to
be governed by rules if credible, binding commitments can be made today
.a
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concerning future moves or actions. The future move in question need not tc
be an unconditional one, but could be a contingent response to exogenous
events (states of nature) or to actions by other players. Discretion applies
when a sequence of policy actions is constrained by the inability to make
credible, binding commitments.
While effective cooperation and international policy coordination clearly c
presupposebehavior governed by rules, not all behavior governed by rules
need be cooperative or desirable. Also, the characterization of the (ideal) Ir
gold standard as 'based loosely on a system of rules' and of a floating at
exchange rate regime as placing 'few limits on the discretion of the in
authorities' seems incorrect. Clearly, the behavior of national money at
stocks or of discount rates could be governed by a set of rules while the
exchange rate floats freely. Whether these rules are specified in terms of
prices, of quantities or of some function of prices and quantities is a mi
separate issue altogether. The IMF's 'exchange rate surveillance' since the dd
advent of floating in the early seventies, represents an attempt to impose St
rules of good neighborly behavior on the international community when th
major currencies float more or less freely. slq
A further relevant issue not addressed by the paper concerns the b
magnitude of the gain from leadership or cooperation. The unambiguous
rank ordering of Nash, Stackelberg and cooperative equilibria doesn't add in
up to a strong case for policy coordination until the likely empirical th
magnitude of the gains has been quantified. The important task of di
measuring the gains from internalizing the macroeconomic policy exter- PC
nalities in the interwar period still remains to be done. fi
The interwar policy makers and advisors clearly recognized the monetary m
and fiscal prerequisites for a successful operation of the gold standard.
First, monetary policy must be directed to the maintenance or restoration is
of 'fundamental' equilibrium in the balance of payments. This requires
that monetary policy not be subject to short-term political pressures, i.e. raj
a defacto independent Central Bank. Such independence is not credible
if the outstanding debt-output ratio is high and current and prospective
public sector deficits are so large that further borrowing is impossible or
prohibitively costly. The pressure to monetize the deficit would become
irresistible. Balanced budget fiscal policy is a simple, if crude, way to rule
offuture monetization. While it
is possible, in principle, to design more flexible, contingent monetary and
budgetary policy rules that permit survival of the fixed exchange rate ot
regime while retaining the capacity for appropriate stabilizing fiscal and
monetary responses to internal or external shocks, the historical record of
attempts at 'firm but flexible' policy design is not too encouraging. It is cajInternational coordination in historical perspective 181
to be hoped that our attempts to sail between this Scylla and Charybdis
will be more successful than those in the twenties and thirties.
es
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il) In his paper on policy coordination, Barry Eichengreen reviews and
•analyzes the international financial history of the late 1900s and the
he interwar years, with emphasis on the later period. The objective of this
ey analysis is '...to see what light this experience sheds on current concerns
he over international policy coordination.' In discussing the interwar period,
-of Eichengreen draws an analogy (attributed to Edward Nevin) between the
a international financial system of that time and '...a car with two
he drivers. ..' — thetwo drivers being, in this case, Britain and the United
ise States. He goes on to say that 'What we would like to know is whether
en the presence of two chauffeurs causes the car to be driven too fast, too
slowly, or too erratically, and what the implications of the chauffeur's
he behavior is for the welfare of passengers.'
-us This discussion begins by summarizing Eichengreen's analysis of the
dd interwar period and his conclusions concerning the deflationary bias of
that period. Using Eichengreen's model, we then offer an explanation —
of different from Eichengreen's —forthe fact that drscount rates over this
period frequently moved together rather than in opposite directions. And,
finally, we turn to the question of what helpful lessons policy makers today
.ry may draw from the analysis of this paper.
d. The theoretical core of Eichengreen's paper is a two-country model that
is designed to illustrate the consequences of the conflicting objectives of
es central banks during the late 1920s. The model assumes a fixed exchange
,e. rate and a gold standard. Domestic monetary authorities manipulate
money supplies (through the central bank discount rate) in order to
ye stabilize price levels and achieve target levels of gold stocks. The inefficiencies
or associated with non-cooperative behavior in this model have two sources.
ne First, each country's monetary policy affects the price level and gold stock
ile of the other country; that is, there are externalities associated with the use
it of each country's policy tool. Second, the gold stock targets of the two
id countries sum to more than the available stock of gold; the countries'
Lte objectives are inconsistent.
The question of whether the non-cooperative Nash solution to Eichen-
of green's model is too inflationary or too deflationary —thatis, whether the
IS caris driven too fast or too slowly —hasan unambiguous answer in this
a182 Commentby J0 Anna Gray
model. The car is driven too slowly. This conclusion may be demonstrated
with the following reasoning: A Pareto-efficient solution to this problem co
is one in which each country achieves its desired price level, but in which th
the two countries split evenly the available gold stock —eachobtaining less fu
than its target amount of gold. This solution can be reached through di
cooperation, but is not easily sustained since each country has an incentive di
to raise its discount rate above the level consistent with this solution in en
an effort to obtain more gold. A rise in either country's discount rate Th
imposes negative externalities on the other country (a lower gold stock and
a lower price level), necessarily lowering the other country's welfare. The ra
Nash solution is reached when the negative price level effects associated
with additional unilateral increases in discount rates outweigh the (ulti- rel
mately unrealized) benefits associated with increased gold-reserves. ex
Clearly, then, the Nash solution is 'too' contractionary since it involves ca4
higher discount rates for both countries than would be obtained under trul
cooperation.
More formally, the deflationary bias inherent in the Nash solution to corfl
Eichengreen's model is illustrated in his figure 4.3. There, the Nash by
solution is given by the intersection of the two countries' reaction pe
functions, Fand F*. The cooperative solution discussed above lies midway
between the two bliss points, E and E*, along the pp locus. It is evident inc
from the diagram that the Nash solution produces lower levels of utility to
for policy makers in both countries than does the cooperative solution. im
Figure 4.2 also provides us with a convenient vehicle for evaluating one im
of the paper's major themes: The fact that discount rates frequently moved sti
in the same direction during the interwar period is taken throughout the
paperas evidence of lack of cooperation between central banks. While this sti
conclusion may follow in more traditional analyses of the gold standard, is
it does not necessarily follow in the game theoretic framework adopted by gr4
Eichengreen. In fact, his model can be used to show that discount rates
may covary positively across countries, regardless of whether policy makers
cooperate or not.
To see this, consider a stochastic version of Eichengreen's model in
which each country's money and goods markets are subject to random disk
disturbances. These disturbances may be global in nature (affecting both
countries in the same way) or country-specific (directly affecting only one coii.
of the two countries). Thus, for example, the money demand functions for
the two countries might be respecified as follows:
(2')
)
Hereis the global disturbance andandareuncorrelated country-
tInternational coordination in historical perspective 183
d specific disturbances. It can be shown that the r-intercept of the home
country's reaction function F is a decreasing function ofandandthat
h the of the foreign country's reaction functionis a decreasing
functionofand Consequently,individual realizations of these
disturbances will produce equilibrium movements of randr*inthe same
direction. This will be true regardless of whether the equilibrium concept
employed is the Nash solution or the cooperative solution' to the model.
te Thus, the stochastic version of Eichengreen's model does not necessarily
id lead one to conclude that a positive covariance of central bank discount
rates is evidence of non-cooperative behavior.
To conclude this discussion, we turn briefly to the question of the
relevance of Eichengreen's analysis the 1980s. As his paper demonstrates,
• explicitlymodelling the game aspects of international policy coordination
es can provide fresh insights into the issues involved. This is likely to be as
er true when considering the 1980s as when considering the interwar years.
The applicability of this paper to the current situation is, however,
to considerably limited by both the special nature of the model employed and
sh by the substantial differences in circumstance prevailing during these two
periods of time.
Eichengreen's model takes as given the 'rules of the game'. Those rules
include not only fixed exchange rates but a gold standard. The situation
ty today is one in which policy makers appear to be searching for Pareto-
• improving rules of the game. Recent work in this area suggests that two
ne important determinants of the choice of rules are (i)the economic
ed structures of the countries under consideration and (ii) the objectives of
he policy makers. Eichengreen does not explore in any detail the economic
us structure of the world economy during the interwar period. However, it
is unlikely that further effort along these lines would produce considerably
greater understanding of the today's situation. The structure of labor,
goods, and capital markets have changed considerably over the past fifty
rs years.It is also the case that policy makers' objectives differ a great deal
from what they appear to have been in the 1920s; targeting levels of gold
in reserves is no longer an important objective for most countries. These
m dissimilarities in structure and objectives are likely to severely limit the
useful information that can be gleaned from the experience of the 1920s
concerning the optimal choice of policy regimes today.
NOTE
1There are of course an infinite number of Pareto-efficient cooperative solutions
to this model. They compose the contract curve. In this discussion, 'the'
cooperative solution refers to that point on the contract curve at which the gains
from cooperation are equally divided between the two countries.
4